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the person a unique individual” (Guignon, 
2004). Guignon’s suggestion bears some 
resemblance to the definition of personality 
traits according to the DSM-IV of the APA 
as “enduring patterns of perceiving, relating 
to, and thinking about the environment and 
oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of 
social and personal contexts.” The empha-
sis of “enduring patters” touches on another 
important feature regarding the true self; 
does the true self consist of enduring pat-
terns, or is it “constantly shifting and react-
ing and altering” (Williams, 2002)? However, 
two other common features of the notion 
of authenticity diverge from the definition 
of personality traits according to the DSM.
First, beside the descriptive content the 
notion of authenticity usually entails a 
normative claim. To be authentic, it does 
not suffice to identify the characteristics 
of one’s true self. In addition, the defining 
set of characteristics must shine through or 
be expressed in the person’s way of living; 
reflecting on undertakings such as rela-
tionships, professional life, and hobbies. 
Thus, we fail to be authentic when we fail 
to express some part of our defining char-
acteristics (Guignon, 2004; Schechtman, 
2004). Second, these characteristics are often 
more or less explicitly described as “natural” 
disposition; implying that this set of inclina-
tions and traits are bestowed on each indi-
vidual by nature. When these two features 
combine, authenticity urges the person to 
live in accordance with this given nature; 
that which “we are” has a privileged position. 
Thus, on this view diversions from a per-
son’s given nature are morally problematic. 
Noteworthy, the moral claim of authenticity 
does not oppose all kinds of alterations of 
a person; only the changes which distance 
a person from his or her true selves. Nor 
is a complete change in personality required 
for the change to be morally significant; or 
the rather major changes alluded to within 
At the heart of the notion of “authentic-
ity” is the idea, with the words of the late 
British philosopher Bernard Williams, “that 
some things are in some real sense really you, 
or express what you are, and others aren’t.” 
This idea have not only attracted and been 
elaborated by philosophers (for further 
orientation, see Taylor, 1995 or Golomb, 
1995), it also appears in our everyday lives. 
Expressions like “Mary wasn’t really herself 
today” or, “Eric finally showed his true face,” 
points to the notion that not all which we 
think, feel, or act on express who we really 
are. Thus, the notion of authenticity can both 
provide new perspectives to philosophical 
concerns regarding MDD and DBS, and 
in addition captures intuitions and beliefs 
held by many patients (Kramer, 1996; Bolt 
and Maartje, 2009). In contemporary ana-
lytical philosophy, authenticity has usually 
been employed in discussions on autonomy 
(Waddell Ekstrom, 1993, 2005), or in theories 
on “the Self” (Schechtman, 1996, 2004). In 
addition, authenticity has surfaced in bioeth-
ical discussions on issues like sex changes, 
human enhancement, and treatment of 
psychiatric disorders. A full account of these 
diverse interpretations cannot be given here 
(for instance, solely accounts of the self range 
from ideas that there are no such thing to 
ideas of the self as an immortal soul); hence 
this article is limited to introducing a few key 
features and their implications.
First one needs to address what the US 
philosopher Marya Schechtman describes as 
the characterization question, namely the set 
of characteristics that makes me the person I 
am; or, when applied to authenticity, the set 
of characteristics defining a person’s “true 
self.” One answer is suggested by the US 
philosopher Charles Guignon in the book 
“On being authentic.” He describes this set of 
characteristics as “the constellation of feel-
ings, needs, desires, capacities, aptitudes, 
dispositions, and creative abilities that make 
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In 2005 the journal Neuron published 
Mayberg et al.’s (2005) pioneering 
study on deep brain stimulation (DBS) 
targeting treatment-refractory major 
depressive disorder (MDD). Since then 
a handful of studies, in total encom-
passing little over 50 patients, have 
been published (Aouizerate et al., 2005; 
Jimenez et al., 2005; Mayberg et al., 2005; 
Kuhn et al., 2007; Lozano et al., 2008; 
Neimat et al., 2008; Schlaepfer et al., 2008; 
Malone et al., 2009; Bewernick et al., 2010; 
Sartorius et al., 2010) and larger trials are 
underway (Bell et al., 2009). A common 
ethical concern voiced when DBS is used 
for a psychiatric disorder such as MDD 
is that the stimulation specifically targets 
cognition, mood, and behavior; elements 
which are closely linked to the patient’s 
personality. Obviously, this holds true 
also for other antidepressants such as psy-
chotherapy and medication. Apart from 
that these standard therapies have been 
of no avail for the patients considered for 
MDD DBS, one could still ask whether 
their potential to alter cognition, mood, 
and behavior, differ - with regard to ethi-
cal concerns - from that of DBS. Further, 
the relevant ethical concern is arguably 
not what functions the stimulation are 
intended to alter, as in psychiatric indica-
tions, but rather what functions that could 
be altered by DBS. Unintended alterations 
of cognition, mood and behaviour could 
occur as a consequence of both psychi-
atric and motoric DBS. Thus, potential 
alterations of personality seem, apart 
from the historical stigma connected with 
the former, to be relevant for most DBS 
indications. A lot of work remains to be 
done before a comprehensive analysis of 
these concerns could be presented. Our 
contribution is to introduce one question 
relevant to the intersection of DBS, MDD, 
and the notion(s) of authenticity.
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least prima facie, should be to restore the per-
sonality to its premorbid state. Though this 
suggestion might have an intuitive appeal, 
and could be defended given a static view of 
the self, it does seem problematic at a closer 
look. Most of the patients with MDD con-
sidered for DBS have lived with the disorder 
for years or even decades. Considering the 
severe impact of the disorder; the depres-
sion, as well as the treatment, is not likely to 
leave the patients unchanged. For instance, 
at the “brains in dialog on DBS” workshop 
in Warsaw a participating Parkinson patient 
gave a telling account of such changes. She 
described that she after the DBS opera-
tion experienced “a third version of me,” in 
comparison to the version of her prior to 
Parkinson’s Disease and the version affected 
by the disease but prior to the effective symp-
tom relief provided by DBS. Another angle 
to this question is provided by an observa-
tion made by American psychiatrist Peter 
Kramer in his book “Listening to Prozac.” 
Some of his (previously) depressed patients 
claimed that, at long last, taking Prozac made 
them experience their true selves for the first 
time, even though they, until then, had had 
another disposition (Kramer, 1996). These 
accounts point to the problems in assum-
ing that there is such a thing as a premor-
bid, implicitly authentic, personality to be 
restored, or, in determining which “version” 
of the self that is authentic. However, if this 
is the case does it then make sense to talk 
about authenticity at all?
We suggest that it does. The concept 
of authenticity as such provides a means 
to entangle both philosophical and gener-
ally held intuitions regarding normative 
claims connected to personality changes. 
A superficial understanding of the con-
cept and its normative implications; for 
instance, that alterations of cognition, 
mood, and behavior due to the disorder 
would be more authentic than comparable 
alterations caused by the treatment; or that 
the moral demand of authenticity require 
that the patient is restored to a premorbid 
state which obviously is gone forever, could 
lead us astray. Likewise, the concept is not 
bound to a dated belief of an authentic self 
which is given by nature and unchanged by 
time. Instead, we suggest that the concept 
of authenticity could be used to capture 
and analyze the intuition that some altera-
tions of cognition, mood and behavior are 
ethically  objectionable, whereas others are 
As previously noted, according to the 
normative thesis of authenticity we are less 
authentic if we fail to express some part of 
our defining characteristics. Conversely, 
to be fully authentic we must express our 
true selves in our daily lives, such as rela-
tionships, professional life, and hobbies. 
Considering the impact of MDD described 
above, it seems obvious that the depression 
prevents the patients from being and liv-
ing authentic; i.e., the alterations caused 
by the depression distance (albeit to what 
degree varies from case to case) a person 
from his or her true selves and are thus 
morally problematic. Accordingly, a suc-
cessful outcome of DBS could be viewed as 
a form of liberation since a hindrance for 
the patient to be and live authentic is elimi-
nated when the depression is vanquished 
or significantly reduced. Some examples 
could be an improved health or quality 
of life, or the ability to return to work, as 
many of Mayberg’s patients managed to 
do (Egan, 2006); or establishing a relation-
ship. If so, then the DBS treatment would 
be in accordance with, even promoting, the 
moral imperative of authenticity. The closer 
we get to an ideal DBS treatment; with set 
criteria for patient selection; optimal brain 
targets identified; and a new generation of 
electrodes which are more tissue friendly, 
minute, with precise and directed stimula-
tion fields, and preferably designed to match 
the intended brain target, the likelihood of 
this outcome increases (something which in 
turn may open up for usage in less severe 
forms of MDD).
Much work lay ahead in identifying and 
examine other issues where authenticity 
could provide insights to the ethical impli-
cations of DBS for MDD. One fundamen-
tal question is whether the depression is 
a part of, or perceived to be a part of, the 
patient’s personality or not? If the former 
is the case it would, restricted to an authen-
ticity perspective only, follow that treating 
the depression is morally problematic – if 
the alteration distance a person from his or 
her true self. More importantly, the patient’s 
view on this issue might influence whether 
he or she will consider DBS, hence empirical 
studies of this, and similar, questions is war-
ranted. Another issue addresses authenticity, 
personality changes, and desired treatment 
outcomes. In a recent article on DBS (Müller 
and Christen, 2011), it was suggested that the 
aim of an ethically acceptable treatment, at 
psychiatry when talking about  personality 
changes. For being morally significant, it suf-
fices if any of the characteristics that make 
up your true self is altered.
Given the belief that it would be mor-
ally problematic to diverge from who we 
really are, how could different interpreta-
tions of this belief shape our views on MDD 
and DBS? We will start by introducing one 
main question, and then briefly sketch some 
other considerations. Sometimes it seems 
to be taken for granted that new technol-
ogy, especially invasive electrodes altering 
brain function, threaten human values such 
as dignity, autonomy, quality of life, or a 
flourishing individual life (these specific 
examples of “threats” are found in Kuhn 
et al., 2009); instead of also examining to 
what extent these techniques could benefit 
or strengthen these values. Though, we will 
build an argument regarding authenticity 
which indicates that the latter may just as 
well be the case. The group of patients con-
sidered for DBS are those suffering from 
severe, often chronic forms of depression 
where all standard therapies have failed. 
Thus, this is our subject matter. So what 
could be said of these patients? In its severe 
forms, MDD causes physical symptoms, 
cognitive impairment, and a diminished 
emotional reactivity and motivation (Malhi 
and Bartlett, 2000; SBU, 2004). Thus, the 
depression greatly impairs the afflicted per-
son’s quality of life (Sobocki et al., 2007); 
it influences personal relationships, work 
ability, the ability to pursue one’s inter-
ests etc. (Malhi and Bartlett, 2000; SBU, 
2004). Further, beside the well known 
risk of suicide – one in six of the patients 
severely affected by MDD take their own 
life (Malhi and Bartlett, 2000) – there are 
indications that MDD can cause permanent 
structural changes in various brain regions, 
for example hippocampus, amygdala, and 
prefrontal cortex, as well as an increased 
likelihood to develop coronary artery 
disease and type 2 diabetes (WHO, 2001; 
Kramer, 2005; Krishnan and Nestler, 2008). 
Nor could these patients, despite common 
romanticized view of MDD, be consid-
ered to benefit from their depressions by 
increased creativity, thoughtfulness, or by 
being more insightful (Elliott, 1999, 2003). 
There might be less severe forms of MDD 
were such claims could hold some validity, 
but for this fraction of patients the opposite 
applies (Kramer, 2005; Ghaemi, 2007).
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unproblematic or even desirable. The con-
cept of authenticity can illuminate ethical 
concerns  regarding changes of a patient’s 
fundamental defining characteristics; how 
these characteristics vary from patient to 
patient; and, over the lifespan of a single 
patient.
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